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INTRODUCTION 
A comparison of the United States and South Africa is instructive 
in understanding how complicit behavior perpetuates institutional 
racism.  In both the United States and South Africa, police and 
prosecutors have often faced accusations of racially biased decision-
making.  Racial bias is not a new concept; it is derived from political 
systems that separated people based on race.1  In the United States, the 
system is commonly known as segregation; in South Africa, the system 
is known as apartheid.  Significantly, in both countries, the racial 
                                                          
1.  See generally MARTIN N. MARGER, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS: 
AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (10th ed. 2015). 
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separation was institutionalized and enforced by governmental agents, 
particularly police and prosecutors. 
However, there are notable differences between the two countries’ 
accountability systems for policing that reveal a deeper understanding 
of the causes of institutional racism than would be possible when 
examining each country separately.  One lesson revealed is the 
importance of understanding the impact of race through the 
intersectional lens of each country’s patriarchal system and culture.  
Additionally, the differences in the countries’ structures and functions 
of accountability systems for policing are instructive because of the 
similarities in the countries’ histories. 
This Article is a culmination of research and interviews personally 
conducted by the author in South Africa.  Many of the understandings 
regarding the structures and function of policing accountability in South 
Africa are directly based off the interviews conducted.  The Article will 
begin with an overview of political inequality and three methods that 
can be used to understand a citizen’s ability to exercise political power.  
Section II discusses the structural barriers created by using criminal 
prosecutions as a solution for police violence.  Section III examines the 
barriers to civil lawsuits as a means for accountability against police 
violence.  Section IV analyzes the policing culture of impunity, and how 
it has acted as a barrier to self-regulation and internal accountability.  
Finally, Section V proposes lessons on how to improve accountability 
for police violence in the future. 
I.  POLITICAL INEQUALITY AND CITIZENS’ ABILITY  
TO DEMAND CHANGE 
There are three measures of political inequality that can be used to 
understand how members of the public exercise political power: voice, 
representation, and influence.2  Political power, in the context of 
accountability for police violence, informs the public’s ability to hold 
police officers and prosecutors responsible for their decisions.  For 
example, both the United States and South Africa’s Constitutions 
provide universal suffrage and the right to protest—so voice is 
                                                          
2.  John Gaventa & Carin Runciman, Untangling Economic and Political 
Inequality: the Case of South Africa, in ISSC ET AL., WORLD SOCIAL SCIENCE REPORT 
2016, CHALLENGING INEQUALITIES: PATHWAYS TO A JUST WORLD 70, 70–71 
(UNESCO pub., 2016).  
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available.  However, as a practical matter, there are inherent systemic 
limitations in both countries that create political inequality. 
A. Voice 
In the United States, many police chiefs and prosecutors are 
publicly elected.3 However, voting rights have been eroded through 
gerrymandering, voter identification laws, and limitations to sections of 
the Voting Rights Act that were designed to limit discriminatory voting 
rights restrictions.4  Furthermore, there are six million convicted felons 
in the United States that are unable to vote.5  Accordingly, many United 
States citizens have restricted or limited ability to effect change and 
correct inequality through the voting process. 
Unlike the United States, in South Africa, citizens do not vote for 
police chiefs or prosecutors.6  Instead, all of these positions are either 
appointed (many by the President) or obtained through civil service.7  
Willie Hofmeyr, a member of the Constitutional Assembly and co-chair 
of the committee dealing with the judiciary and the legal system,8 
stated, “A lot of us went in [to drafting the Constitution] starry-eyed” 
and in retrospect, the Constitutional Assembly should have realized that 
“not every President was going to be Mandela.”9  As a result of this 
                                                          
3.  Scott M. Matheson, The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 38 
FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 879 (1990).  
4.  ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT (2016). See also Amita Kelly, Does it 
Matter that 95% of Elected Prosecutors are White?, NPR (July 8, 2015, 4:59 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/08/420913118/does-it-matter-
that-95-of-elected-prosecutors-are-white. 
5.  Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of 
Felon Disenfranchisement, 2016, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-
estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/. 
6.  Interview with Willie Hofmeyr, Deputy Nat’l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 
Nat’l Prosecuting Auth., in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Hofmeyr 
Interview]. 
7.  Id. See generally Adam Kassner, Diggin’ Deep into Gold Fields: South 
Africa’s Unrealized Black Economic Empowerment in the Shadows of Executive 
Discretion, 48 CORNNELL INT’L L.J. 667 (2015). 
8.  William Andrew “Willie” Hofmeyr, SOUTH AFRICA HISTORY ONLINE (Sept. 
1, 2011), http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/william-andrew-willie-hofmeyr. 
9.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6. 
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truth, Hofmeyr believes that having the president appoint such a large 
amount of law enforcement positions with little oversight was not the 
best idea.10  Hofmeyr now believes that law enforcement positions 
should be appointed in ways more similar to other officials, such as the 
Public Protector or the head of the South African Human Rights 
Commission.11 Both of these positions require a confirmation process 
of 60% parliamentary approval, preceded by a public interview process 
to ensure adequate opportunity for public scrutiny and voice.12 
B. Representation 
In the United States, prosecutors are vested with the ability to 
potentially hold police officers accountable.13  However, prosecutors 
are publicly elected, and elected prosecutors do not reflect the 
demographics of the American public.14  White Americans make up 
95% of elected prosecutors and women make up 17% of elected 
prosecutors.15  This racial and gender disparity is exacerbated because 
legislators who write the laws that create systems of accountability for 
police are also largely unrepresentative of public demographics.16  This 
disparity is demonstrated in the chart below:17 
                                                          
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Prosecution of Violation of Certain Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (Westlaw 
through Pub. Law. No. 115-90). See generally John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police 
Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 803–11 (2000). 
14.  See Jamiles Lartey, White Men Make up 79% of Elected Prosecutors in US, 
Study Says, THE GUARDIAN (July 7, 2015, 5:32 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jul/07/us-elected-prosecutors-white-men-
criminal-justice-system. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Reid Wilson, In the States: Breaking Down Legislative Demographics, 
MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 11, 2015, 12:48 PM), 
https://morningconsult.com/2015/12/11/in-the-states-breaking-down-legislative-
demographics/. 
17.  Id. 
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 In South Africa, there are active efforts to broaden the recruitment 
of prosecutors, as part of general legal affirmative action requirements, 
so that prosecutors are more representative of the racial and gender 
composition in South Africa.18  In the United States, prosecutors are 
trained lawyers; therefore, one apparent barrier to establishing a 
representative pipeline among prosecutors is the continued racial 
disparities in educational attainment.19 
Further comparing each country’s federal legislatures, the South 
African National Assembly has greater gender equality than the United 
States Congress.  In 2015, 40% of the National Assembly’s members 
                                                          
18.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.  
19.  MARGER, supra note 1, at 202–04. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, 
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (2012); Ronald 
Brownstein, The Challenge of Educational Inequality, THE ATLANTIC (May 19, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/05/education-inequality-
takes-center-stage/483405/; Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Ethnic and Racial Disparities in 
Education (Aug. 3, 2012), https://www.apa.org/ed/resources/racial-disparities.pdf.  
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were women,20 whereas only 24% of United States’ legislators were 
women.21  One possible reason for this is the African National Congress 
(“ANC”), the current majority in South Africa, adopted a 50% 
voluntary gender quota system in parliament.22 
Still, in South Africa, heterosexism and patriarchy continue to be 
part of the culture with patriarchy cutting across race and class.23  As a 
result, “ambitious women climb the ladder of patriarchy,” and those 
who try to speak up against it “pay a higher price politically” than those 
who might disagree on policy issues.24  Thus, more representation does 
not necessarily yield equitable outcomes as cultural forces persist.  It is 
important to understand the disparities in representation through the 
lens of both race and gender to gain a greater understanding of the 
power structures within these institutions. 
C. Influence 
In both countries, the most significant disparities exist within the 
realm of relative influence and power.  Three factors limit an 
individual’s ability to exert influence over the political system: money, 
optimism about agency, and narratives perpetuated by the press.  Each 
of these factors impact an individual’s ability to effect change within 
the government that would allow for greater accountability of police 
violence. 
1. Money as Influence 
In the United States, Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 
a recent United States Supreme Court decision, opened the floodgates 
that previously protected the political system from corporate money.25  
One study estimated 26% of the 2016 presidential election spending 
                                                          
20.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6; SADC GENDER PROTOCOL 2017 
BAROMETER 74 (Collen Morna et al., eds., 2017); South Africa, QUOTA PROJECT (Feb. 
4, 2015), http://www.quotaproject.org/country/south-africa. 
21.  See generally Wilson, supra note 16.  
22.  See Constitution of the African National Congress, Rule 6 (Nov. 2007). 
23.  Interview with Gail Smith, Head of Advocacy and Comm., S. Afr. Hum. 
Rts. Comm’n, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Smith Interview]. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
7
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was possible as a result of Citizens United.26  Thus, those with access 
to corporate money possess an outsized influence on the election of 
decision makers who serve to protect individual rights and develop 
systems of accountability. 
In South Africa, working for the government (in both elected and 
civil servant positions) is often the only means of upward social 
mobility.27  Accordingly, individuals are more likely to take and 
perform those jobs in accordance with their own self-interest, rather 
than out of a calling to public service.28  Corruption within this system 
is amplified by a middle class that seeks upward mobility, but remains 
deeply divided by race.29  This ultimately results in a group of people 
who are unable to consolidate enough political power to change the 
system.30  Consequently, many South Africans are left “fighting over 
crumbs the economic elite are willing to give.”31  The patriarchal 
culture provides further “scaffolding of corruption” because much of 
the corruption in South Africa is done in accordance with the familial 
relationships of men.32 
While the corruption of the political process by wealth in South 
Africa is more direct than the United States, both countries must deal 
with the political inequality of those with money or power having an 
outsized influence. 
                                                          
26.  Adam Lioz et al., Court Cash: 2016 Election Money Resulting Directly 
From Supreme Court Rulings, DEMOS (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://www.demos.org/publication/court-cash-2016-election-money-resulting-
directly-supreme-court-rulings. 
27.  Interview with Steven Friedman, Res. Professor, U. of Johannesburg, in 
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Friedman Interview]. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32. Smith Interview, supra note 23; see also IBP, US-SOUTH AFRICA ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK: STRATEGIC INFORMATION, 
DEVELOPMENTS, CONTACTS 57 (2003); Barbara Oomen, Group Rights in Post-
Apartheid South Africa: The Case of Traditional Leaders, 44 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 73, 
88 (1999).  
8
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2. Optimism and Belief in Agency 
In the United States, Black Americans are almost evenly split on 
whether the country will eventually make the changes needed to give 
Blacks equal rights to Whites.  Forty-two percent believe the country 
will eventually make the necessary changes, 43% do not, and 8% argue 
the country has already made such changes.33  On the other hand, White 
Americans are much more optimistic about the current state of equality 
with 38% believing the necessary changes have been made, 40% 
believing the changes will be made, and only 11% believing that they 
will not be made.34  These numbers are likely explained by the 
differences in each group’s experiences with governmental 
interactions.35  For example, Black Americans are 2.8 times more likely 
than White Americans to die as a result of interactions with the 
government.36  Despite the differences in each group’s experiences with 
the government, Black American voter participation is only 5% less 
than White Americans.37  Thus, in the United States, despite the lack of 
optimism about equal rights and the disparities in police violence, Black 
Americans continue to demonstrate comparable belief in their agency 
through voting. 
In South Africa, democracy and the personal agency that 
accompanies it are still nascent.  Black South Africans, in particular, 
while disappointed, are not surprised to see people in positions of power 
exploit and abuse the citizenry.38  Furthermore, South African people 
                                                          
33.  Renee Stepler, 5 Key Takeaways About Views of Race and Inequality in 
America, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/06/27/key-takeaways-race-and-inequality/. 
34.  Id. 
35.  James W. Buehler, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in the Use of Lethal Force by 
US Police, 2010-2014, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 295 (2017). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Voting Turnout Rates, by Race and Ethnicity, 2014, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 
19, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/01/19/millennials-make-up-almost-
half-of-latino-eligible-voters-in-2016/ph_election-2016_appen-chart-07/. 
38.  Interview with Siphiwe Segodi, Project Officer, Freedom of Expression 
Inst., in Soweto, S. Afr. (Jan. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Segodi Interview]; see also 
Kassner, supra note 7, at 685 (“President Jacob Zuma—himself the subject of 783 
counts of corruption that were dropped—has overseen a tumultuous regime that has 
faced numerous corruption charges encompassing the abuse of public funds, from 
9
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have a deep loyalty to the African National Congress—the current 
majority party and party of the liberation movement.39  This loyalty, 
coupled with a history of an oppressive government, creates a 
challenging environment for political alternatives.40  Thus, 
disappointment with economic stagnation is often understood as 
disappointment with democracy because “freedom is yielding very 
little” for people in regards to material change given “you can’t eat 
freedom.”41  Some members of the liberation movement recognize this 
challenge saying, “We didn’t do it for the sake of the organization 
[referring to the ANC], we did it for the country.”42 
However, many South Africans are realistic and willing to accept 
incremental change.43  One challenge to realizing material change in 
South Africa is that entrepreneurship is not a deeply valued concept.44  
Both the liberation movement’s founding communist ideas, such as 
governmental allocation of resources, as well as apartheid-era 
oppression created a culture that does not support entrepreneurship.45  
As a result, the economic disappointment people feel is exacerbated by 
a lack of agency.  Therefore, in South Africa, the belief in agency, or 
lack thereof, directly influences South Africans’ ability and desire to 
utilize the government, which further exacerbates the political 
inequality. 
3. Narratives Perpetuated by the Press 
While both countries have a free press, they deal with issues 
regarding media “echo chambers”46 that present different information 
                                                          
improvement of his rural Nkandla residence to improper awarding of government 
contracts.”). 
39.  Interview with Carin Runciman, Senior Researcher, U. of Johannesburg, in 
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Runciman Interview]. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Interview with Robert McBride, Exec. Dir., The Indep. Police Investigative 
Directorate, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter McBride Interview]. 
43.  Runciman Interview, supra note 39. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. 
46.  See JESSICA CLARK & TRACY VAN SLYKE, BEYOND THE ECHO CHAMBER: 
HOW A NETWORKED PROGRESSIVE MEDIA CAN RESHAPE AMERICAN POLITICS (2010). 
10
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and context.  In the United States, this was attributed to increasingly 
partisan news consumption.47  Although many Americans’ main news 
source is television, “40% of all Americans get their news from online 
sources,” including social media such as Facebook and Twitter.48  The 
main problem with new online sources is that many are secondary news 
sources with altered or skewed information.49  Moreover, many U.S. 
media outlets continue to show Black Americans in “crime news 
narratives,” which have a severe impact on accountability for police 
violence against Black Americans.50 
For example, Tamir Rice was a 12-year-old African American with 
a fake gun who was shot and killed after police officers were alerted to 
a “man” in a nearby park with a “gun.”51  From the time of Rice’s death 
to the shooting officer’s “grand jury, 5,912 media items and broadcast 
reports were published on the racially-charged killing.”52  Significantly, 
during a press conference, the prosecutor in charge of the officer’s 
indictment stated he felt no need to present certain information to the 
grand jury because the jurors could read about it in the newspaper.53 
                                                          
An “echo chamber” is a term used to describe a situation where information and ideas 
are perpetuated and validated by repeated communications within a specific system. 
Id. 
47.  Brendan Nyhan, Relatively Few Americans Live in Partisan Media Bubble, 
But They’re Influential, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/upshot/relatively-few-people-are-partisan-
news-consumers-but-theyre-influential.html?_r=0. 
48.  Bryan Adamson, Reconsidering Pre-Indictment Publicity: Racialized 
Crime News, Grand Juries and Tamir Rice, ALA. L. REV. 1, 41 (2017); see also Amy 
Mitchell et al., The Modern News Consumer: news Attitudes and Practices in the 
Digital Era, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/ 
2016/07/07/the-modern-news-consumer/.  
49.  See generally CLARK & SLYKE, supra note 46.  
50.  Adamson, supra note 48, at 4; see also Joseph Torres, Interrupting a White 
Racial Narrative: Ruling Gives Communities of Color More Opportunities to Tell Our 
Stories, FREEPRESS (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.freepress.net/blog/2016/07/14/ruling-gives-communities-of-color-
more-opportunities; Blavity Team, New Study Finds News Outlets Promote False, 
Negative Portrayals of Black Families that Don’t Match Reality, BLAVITY (last 
updated Dec. 19, 2017), https://blavity.com/color-change-study-news-outlets-
promote-false-negative-portrayals-black-families-reality.  
51.  Adamson, supra note 48, at 2. 
52.  Id. at 2–3. 
53.  Id. at 4.  
11
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Thus, in the United States, the media plays a critical role in 
accountability for police violence. 
In South Africa, Black journalists perceive the press as “still very 
[racially] segregated because of ownership of newspapers.”54  The 
South African government runs many of the radio and television 
stations, which remain important methods of news consumption.55  This 
also allows the government to control what information is shared. For 
example, the South African Broadcasting Corporation56 censored 
reports of protests and decided not to broadcast “violent” protests.57 
However, unlike the United States, South Africa’s Internet connectivity 
remains relatively low.58 According to the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s World Factbook, 54% of South Africans are connected to the 
Internet.59  Still, activists in South Africa state the community is using 
social media to document these incidents, and when the public does not 
take pictures, “we don’t know what happens in the cases.”60  Thus, 
social media and online news sources are beginning to play a larger role 
in South Africa as they do in the United States. 
Finally, in both countries, the media has played a significant role in 
drawing and connecting historic comparisons between policing 
practices from the eras of racial separation and present day incidents.61  
                                                          
54. Interview with Mpikeleni Duma, Journalist, Sowetan Live, in Johannesburg, 
S. Afr. (Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Duma Interview]. 
55. Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6. 
56. See, e.g., South African Broadcasting Corp., http://www.sabc.co.za/sabc/ 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2018). “The SABC controls all free broadcast television and the 
majority of major radio outlets. The SABC was once seen as the Government’s voice, 
but it is not in the midst, of a historic reorganization and change of direction. Although 
it is still state owned, the SABC maintains its editorial independence from the 
Government. SABC news programming offered balanced coverage of the 
Government and the leading opposition parties.” South Africa, 22 Ann. Hum. Rts. 
Rep. Submitted to Cong. By U.S. Dep’t St. 616, 320 (1997).  
57.  Interview with Bongani Xezwi, Organizer, Right to Know, in Soweto, S. 
Afr. (Jan. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Xezwi Interview]. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Central Intelligence Agency, Africa: South Africa, WORLD FACTBOOK (last 
updated Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ resources/the-
world-factbook/geos/sf.html.  
60.  Xezwi interview, supra note 57. 
61.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6; Charles Blow, Police Violence: American 
Epidemic, American Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), 
12
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Thus, the media has the ability to exert influence over the political 
process, and those who control or distort it command a disproportionate 
amount of political power. 
II. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AS A MEANS 
OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POLICE VIOLENCE 
A. United States 
In the United States, the broad range of acceptable standards for use 
of police force creates the basis for structural barriers to criminal 
prosecutions as a means of accountability for police violence.  Indeed, 
a constitutionally mandated “reasonableness standard” has evolved 
through common law and applies nationally for police use of force.62  
However, detailed policies are decided at local and state levels of 
government, and each police department mandates and enforces its own 
use of force policy.63  Furthermore, police unions often negotiate due 
process protections beyond what is afforded to civilians.  For example, 
when police misconduct has occurred or been alleged, interviewing the 
police officer may be delayed or stagnated based on pre-negotiated 
regulations, making these cases even more difficult to investigate.64 
Generally, the local prosecutor’s office has jurisdiction to file 
criminal charges, which often results in conflicting incentives because 
local prosecutors depend on local police forces to investigate all of their 
cases.65  Federal civil rights claims enforce Constitutional limits on law 
enforcement officers’ conduct and are meant to serve as a safeguard 
                                                          
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/opinion/police-violence-american-epidemic-
american-consent.html. 
62.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 20–22 (1968).  
63.  See generally Review, USE OF FORCE PROJECT (Sept. 20, 2016), 
http://useofforceproject.org/#review. 
64.  See generally Review, CHECK THE POLICE (June 29, 2016), 
http://www.checkthepolice.org/#review. 
65.  Radley Balko, Prosecutors’ Union Inadvertently Demonstrates Why Local 
Prosecutors Shouldn’t Investigate Police Shootings, WASH. POST (June 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/06/23/prosecutors-
union-inadvertently-demonstrates-why-local-prosecutors-shouldnt-investigate-
police-shootings/?utm_term=.7cea680a5f9f. 
13
Juneja: Accountability in Policing: How Complicity Perpetuates Institutio
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017
Juneja camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/16/2018  9:24 AM 
14 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48 
against these incentive structures.66  However, even with a motivated 
prosecutor, the doctrine of qualified immunity limits criminal 
prosecution that holds police officers accountable.67  Qualified 
immunity shields government employees from civil damages liability 
so long as their actions could be found to be reasonably consistent with 
rights they allegedly violated.68  Additionally, qualified immunity can 
make criminal prosecutions more challenging because one of the 
threshold questions is whether the force used was beyond what is 
objectively reasonable and consistent with the individual’s 
constitutional rights.69  Therefore, the analysis significantly depends on 
how the case law, regarding use of force, is applied in a jurisdiction. 
In the United States, there are additional structural issues that 
undermine the effectiveness of criminal prosecutions as a means of 
accountability for police violence.  First, the United States is the only 
country in the world that has elected prosecutors.70  Prosecutors who 
are publicly elected may be more concerned with who among their 
constituents are likely to vote in the next local elections, and those 
constituents’ willingness to prosecute law enforcement.71  Second, a 
prosecutor’s decision to charge or not to charge a police officer is not 
subject to any review process within the jurisdiction where it was 
decided.72  Additionally, there is no avenue to challenge prosecutorial 
discretion for charging outside a government actor’s jurisdiction.73  
Third, United States’ judges are often former prosecutors; therefore, 
                                                          
66.  18 U.S.C. § 242 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-89). 
67.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Westlaw); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). 
68.  Creighton, 483 U.S. at 638. 
69.  Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998). Cf. Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding even prisoners have a liberty interest from 
serious bodily injury or death). 
70.  Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 6, 
15, 28 (2012). 
71.  See Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 95 
(2017). See generally David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of 
Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473 (2016); Kelly Bowden 
Gray, Community Prosecution: After Two Decades, Still New Frontiers, 32 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 199, 200–02 (2008).  
72.  Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
73.  See id. at 380–81.  
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many deal with the same acculturation issues that current prosecutors 
face both as a result of their former role as a prosecutor and their current 
one as a neutral arbiter of the law.74  Finally, even where there may be 
a robust prosecution effort, juries are unlikely to convict police 
officers.75  Jurors are unlikely to convict police officers because they 
are hesitant to question a police officer’s judgment and are likely to 
view police officers as people they would trust in their daily lives.76 
The United States has various barriers to overcome, but some have 
recognized the need to create change.  In 2015, California Senator 
Barbara Boxer and New Jersey Senator Cory Booker submitted the 
Police Reporting Information, Data, and Evidence Act of 2015, which 
would require every case where an officer kills or causes serious bodily 
injury against a civilian to the Department of Justice.77  Additionally, 
the police department would have to report all victims’ demographic 
data.78 
B. South Africa 
The formal structures in South Africa are much more robust relative 
to the United States.  First, the Criminal Procedure Act explicitly states 
and governs the standard for use of deadly force by police,79 and the 
Constitutional Court has interpreted this standard.80  Thus, in South 
Africa, there is an explicit constitutional standard that governs use of 
                                                          
74.  The Editorial Board, The Homogeneous Federal Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/opinion/the-homogeneous-federal-
bench.html?_r=0. 
75.  Kimberly Kindy and Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/ 
investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-
prosecuted/?utm_term=.a9076bb16152. 
76.  Id. 
77.  See Police Reporting Information, Data, and Evidence Act of 2015, S. 1476, 
114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) [hereinafter PRIDE Act]; David A. Graham, Why Is It 
So Hard to Track Police Killings?, THE ATLANTIC (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/why-is-it-so-hard-to-track-
police-killings/394772/.  
78.  PRIDE Act, supra note 77, § 2(B).  
79.  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 § 49 (S. Afr.). 
80.  Okyerebea Ampofo-Anti, Kim Robinson & Stu Woolman, The South 
African Police Service, S. AFR. CONST. 23B.3 (2008).  
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force, unlike the United States, where there is a series of fact specific 
common law cases.81  Second, national statutory law establishes and 
governs the institutions that govern police (South African Police 
Service); investigations of the police (Independent Police Investigative 
Directorate); prosecutions (National Prosecuting Authority); and 
human rights (South Africa Human Rights Commission).82 
Although police officers do belong to unions in South Africa, they 
do not have enough collective bargaining power to create procedural 
barriers to investigations, such as additional due process rights not 
afforded to civilians.83  This allows for national consistency in training 
and accountability practices as well as equal legitimacy among each 
institution.  Further, there is mandated reporting for individuals who die 
in police custody or are killed as a result of police action.84  This 
reporting allows for patterns to be identified and interventions to be 
conducted.85  However, two identified weaknesses are that there is no 
auditing process for these reports, and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) does not prosecute violations of the mandatory 
reporting statute.86 
Two recent developments have further strengthened South Africa’s 
institutional framework.  First, McBride’s Constitutional Court case 
affirmed and strengthened the independence of the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate (IPID).87  However, the IPID continues to 
recognize the dangers associated with holding systems of power 
accountable, with McBride saying, “We might be causalities of the 
work, but we’re laying a foundation.”88  Second, IPID’s leadership 
recently made an internal policy change to refer all cases to the NPA 
for review regardless of the recommendation about whether or not the 
case should be prosecuted, thereby creating a secondary layer of 
                                                          
81.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.  
82.  Id. See generally South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (last updated 
Sept. 28, 2012).  
83.  McBride Interview, supra note 42.  
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  See News 24, Constitutional court rules in favour of Robert McBride, MAIL 
& GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2016, 10:48AM), https://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-06-
breaking-concourt-rules-in-favour-of-robert-mcbride. 
88.  McBride Interview, supra note 42.  
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review.89  Previously, IPID only sent cases it believed should be 
prosecuted by the NPA.90  Thus, while IPID maintains the investigatory 
role in police violence cases, they are no longer providing the NPA with 
a limited selection of cases.  Additionally, there was legislative 
discussion about making appointments confirmable and to create a 
removal process in response to concerns about the NPA’s 
politicization.91  This would create a system of checks and balances on 
law enforcement institutions rather than concentrating that power in 
executive appointments. 
In South Africa, the barriers for prosecutors holding police officers 
accountable are less structural and result more from the way the 
structures function.92  First, in South Africa, when a police officer is 
charged with a crime, the Directors of Public Prosecution (DPP) must 
be informed, and a more senior prosecutor at the regional level (as 
opposed to a local one) may take over the case.93  However, despite the 
increased possibility for conflicts of interest with local prosecutors, 
currently, a regional prosecutor is not required to take over the case.94  
Second, South African prosecutors usually have that job for the entirety 
of their career, which presents concerns about prosecuting officers 
attempting to maintain good relationships with police officers, as a 
matter of reputation.95  This conflict could be remedied by creating a 
unit that solely focuses on prosecutions of police officers. Similarly, the 
head of the NPA can currently reassign prosecutors and, thus, is 
susceptible to capture.96  This issue is not merely hypothetical; in a 
                                                          
89.  Interview with Matthews Sesoko, Dir. of Investigations, The Indep. Police 
Investigative Directorate, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Sesoko 
Interview]. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Thulani Gqirana, Breytenbach: Decay of SA’s Justice System Must End, 
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2015, 6:33 AM), https://mg.co.za/article/2015-01-22-
breytenbach-decay-of-sas-justice-system-must-end. 
92.  See generally Greg Nicolson, After 59 Deaths Allegedly at the Hands of the 
SAPS in Gauteng, No Officer has Faced Justice, THE DAILY MAVERICK (July 18, 
2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-18-after-59-
deaths-allegedly-at-the-hands-of-saps-in-gauteng-no-officer-has-faced-
justice/#.WYOpAdPyuqA. 
93.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6.  
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
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recent police corruption case, the head of the NPA assigned prosecutors 
who were not skilled enough to undertake those cases.97  Third, the 
investigations of police officers are subject to serious resource 
constraints.98  However, there is speculation that these resource 
constraints are intentional in an attempt to limit the IPID’s ability to 
investigate corruption.99  Finally, the accountability mechanism 
outlined in the National Prosecuting Authority Act for prosecutors is 
still being implemented and does not provide a robust check on 
prosecutorial discretion as of yet.100 
C. Cultural and Systemic Barriers to Prosecution as a Means 
forAccountability of Police Violence 
Although the United States and South Africa experience different 
structural barriers for prosecution to be used as a viable tool for 
accountability of police violence, the cultural issues are largely similar.  
In the United States, the prosecution of criminal laws during the 
segregation era that sought to oppress Black Americans were not 
entirely eliminated.101  Instead, laws requiring racial separation 
transformed into race-neutral laws with racially disparate impacts 
enforced by prosecutors in the form of the war on drugs.102 
In South Africa, every prosecutor kept their job post-apartheid as a 
result of the “sunset clauses;”103 however, there was a voluntary early 
retirement program.104  Thus, in both countries, after the eras of racial 
                                                          
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id.; see also National Prosecution Authority Act 32 of 1998 § 28(2)(4) (S. 
Afr.) (“The procedure to be followed in conducting an investigation shall be 
determined by the Investigating Director at his or her discretion. . . . ”).   
101.  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF BLINDNESS (The New Press ed., 2010); Jasmine B. 
Gonzales Rose, Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: Language Rights Under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 6 ALA. L. REV. 167 (2014); Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, 
Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. L. REV. 299 (2010).  
102.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 101.  
103.  HEIN MARAIS, SOUTH AFRICA: LIMITS TO CHANGE: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF TRANSITION 220 (U. Capetown Press 2d ed., 2001). These sunset clauses 
were created in 1993 to protect incumbent civil servants from retrenchment. Id. 
104.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6. 
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol48/iss1/2
Juneja camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/16/2018  9:24 AM 
2017] ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLICING 19 
separation, the general culture of prosecutions persisted because the 
prosecutors during the segregation era were the same personnel who 
trained the next generation of prosecutors.  Furthermore, prosecutors in 
both countries became acculturated towards a default of trust towards 
police officers because their role requires them to trust police in 
prosecuting their other cases on a daily basis.105 
In the United States, the majority of Americans have only recently 
become aware of critiques about police violence.106  Similarly, in South 
Africa, while there is activism around the way police treat protestors, 
there is little focus on the way police interact with alleged criminal 
suspects.107  Some argue the public may be unwilling to criticize 
policing practices when crime rates are high, and instead demand 
harsher government action, as is currently the case in South Africa.108  
However, disaggregated data, in both countries, demonstrates crime 
rates do not correlate or causally relate to levels of police violence.109  
Therefore, this suggests the public disinclination to criticize 
government action is largely due to cultural priorities.110  Additionally, 
in the United States, police violence may make communities less 
willing to engage with the police, thereby creating a negative cycle of 
community violence and further justification for police violence.111  
                                                          
105.  Id.; see also Jacobi, supra note 13, at 803–04 (“[United States] prosecutors 
also find themselves in a difficult position when faced with an accusation of police 
misconduct. They work closely with police and their ability to succeed in their 
everyday tasks of prosecuting routine crimes depends on the work and cooperation of 
police officers.”). 
106.  Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 
FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1775–77 (2016); Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History 
of Police Brutality in the U.S., SMITHSONIAN (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/long-painful-history-
police-brutality-in-the-us-180964098/.  
107.  Xezwi Interview, supra note 57.  
108.  Telephone Interview with Antony Altbeker, Author, The Dirty Work of 
Democracy (Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Altbeker Interview]. 
109.  DAVID BRUCE, AN ACCEPTABLE PRICE TO PAY?: THE USE OF LETHAL 
FORCE BY POLICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 5–6 (2010); see also Police Violence Map, It’s 
Not About Crime, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE (last updated Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/ (graph demonstrates the lack of correlation 
between crime rate and police violence in the United States). 
110.  BRUCE, supra note 109, at 5–6. 
111.  Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in 
the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857 (2016). 
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Likewise, in South Africa, the correlation is closely related to deaths of 
police officers because “police always revenge.”112 
Both countries also share systemic issues in the viability of 
prosecutors’ offices as a means for accountability for police violence.  
For example, in both countries, prosecutors are not responsible for the 
agencies conducting the case investigation, but the strength of the case 
directly depends on the strength of the investigation.  In the United 
States, prosecutors are often dependent on the investigation of the same 
police departments where the accused officer works. For example, in 
the Freddie Gray case in Baltimore, the prosecutor Marilyn Mosby 
received very little assistance from the police department in conducting 
the investigation.113 
Similarly, in South Africa, the NPA runs into issues of police 
networks where police officers try to cover up for each other.114  IPID 
is responsible for investigating criminal activity by the police as well as 
all deaths that occur in police custody.115  Although it is independent 
from police services, IPID has been described as “useless” by 
organizers because local police conduct the initial crime scene survey 
and preservation, during which many basic forensics are compromised 
and dockets are lost.116  Additionally, IPID noted the police are familiar 
with the investigatory process, and the majority of cases are those where 
police officers are the only witnesses.117  Issues of familiarity with 
process are also true in the United States. 
Overall, both countries face different structural barriers when using 
prosecutors as a means to hold officers accountable for police violence.  
South Africa’s creation of IPID shows one possible solution is to create 
an independent group of investigators unconnected to internal police 
departments.  However, any independent body that will be used as a 
                                                          
112.  Segodi Interview, supra note 38.  
113.  Wil S. Hylton, Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-gray-
baltimore.html. 
114.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6. 
115.  Id.  
116.  Interview with Dale McKinley, Author, South Africa’s Corporatised 
Liberation: A critical analysis of the ANC in power, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 10, 
2017) [hereinafter McKinley Interview]. 
117.  Xezwi Interview, supra note 57.  
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means for policing accountability needs effective investigatory tools to 
actually hold police officers accountable. 
III. BARRIERS TO CIVIL SUITS AS A MEANS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
AGAINST POLICE VIOLENCE 
In the United States, individuals can only bring civil rights claims 
against local municipalities, including police departments and 
prosecutors’ offices, when an injury is inflicted as a result of a 
government policy.118  Otherwise, individuals are limited, if not 
completely barred, from suing governmental entities under the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity.119  These types of suits are further complicated 
by obscure policies regarding data collection requirements and 
limitations on public access to data that make it challenging to identify 
a governmental agency’s pattern or practice of bad policy.120  The 
federal government does not mandate all state and local departments to 
report deaths in their custody, and the principles of federalism would 
make such mandates challenging.121 
On the other hand, in South Africa, civil suits can be brought 
against the NPA for failure to bring criminal charges, thereby making 
the NPA’s decisions subject to judicial review.122  Further, the legal 
procedure, in such cases, provides plaintiffs with a high level of access 
to information during discovery.123  However, much of the population 
face financial barriers when bringing civil suits, and the non-profit 
impact litigation sector is still developing.124  Therefore, in both the 
United States and South Africa, civil litigation provides recourse for a 
limited subset of individuals who would seek to hold police officers 
accountable through civil, rather than criminal, litigation. 
                                                          
118.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
119.  See id. 
120.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996). 
121.  See Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, The Justice Department Corrects for A 
Use-of-Force Blind Spot, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/justice-department-police-use-
force/504050/. 
122.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6. 
123.  Id. 
124.  The non-profit litigation sector not only represents clients, but also seeks 
to change the law. Altbeker Interview, supra note 108. 
21
Juneja: Accountability in Policing: How Complicity Perpetuates Institutio
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017
Juneja camera ready (Do Not Delete) 5/16/2018  9:24 AM 
22 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48 
IV. PAST AS A PROLOGUE: POLICING CULTURE OF IMPUNITY AS A 
BARRIER TO SELF-REGULATION AND INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The concept of path dependency is instructive in understanding 
why police departments in both countries continue to demonstrate 
similar behaviors to the eras of racial separation and fail to self-regulate 
or hold themselves accountable.  Path dependency is the theory that an 
organization or institution’s history greatly informs its present state.125  
Path dependency occurs for three possible reasons: (1) historical 
experiences shape mutually consistent expectations; (2) informational 
channels or codes and durable physical goods allow an organization to 
operate efficiently; and (3) the strong interrelatedness among the 
constituent elements of complex organizations.126  In modern parlance, 
these three concepts could be defined as: (1) institutional values or 
culture, (2) patterns of behaviors and continued tools, and (3) social 
networks and relationships. 
A. Institutional Values and Culture 
Both the United States and South Africa practice unique and strong 
policing cultures.  Often, that culture includes an element of impunity.  
In the United States, law students participating in the Civil Rights and 
Restorative Justice Project are investigating murders of African 
Americans during an era of racial terror from 1930 to 1970.127  Before 
these law students’ efforts, many of these murders were never 
investigated by police, let alone tried in a court of law.128  Presently, 
                                                          
125.  INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND PEACEBUILDING: CHANGE, PATH-
DEPENDENCY AND SOCIETAL DIVISIONS IN POST-WAR COMMUNIITIES 91 (Nadine 
Ansor & Sabine Kurtenbach eds., 2016); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the 
Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA 
L. REV. 601 (2001); Paul A. David, Why are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’? 
Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 
5 STRUCTURAL & ECON. DYNAMICS 2 205, 207 (1994). 
126.  David, supra note 125, at 209. 
127.  Beth Schwartzapfel, Getting Away with Murder, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Jan. 3, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/03/ getting-
away-withmurder?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_ 
source=opening-statement&utm_term=newsletter-20170104-665#.nq2Ud83Fr. 
128.  Id. 
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72% of U.S. police officers disagree with the statement, “[O]fficers 
who consistently do a poor job are held accountable.”129 
In South Africa, Matthews Sesoko, the Director of Investigations 
for IPID, stated, “I don’t think they [police] are trained to be violent in 
police college, the problem is when they get to the precinct and who 
their mentors were.”130  Sesoko emphasized this culture is not new, 
stating the “problem is you have a culture of a police force from the 
apartheid era where it was a normal thing to be brutal to citizens.  There 
was always impunity.”131  Thus, a culture of impunity has historical 
roots in both the United States and South Africa. 
Additionally, in both countries, the culture of policing is deeply 
rooted in police officers’ identity as police officers.  In the United 
States, according to Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, this creates a 
problem known as the “thin blue line” or the “code of silence.”132  This 
policing culture can be so deeply ingrained that even head police 
officers and the departments’ internal affairs units can become 
compromised.133  Significantly, these are the very officers who are 
charged with investigating police misconduct and violence.134  
Similarly, in South Africa, Robert McBride says that for police officers, 
“regardless of color, blood stays blue.”135  Additionally, McBride stated 
that the code of silence in South Africa amongst police officers creates 
a “blue curtain, behind which you are not allowed to see.”136 
Both the United States and South Africa’s policing cultures are 
related to the large percentage of men in the police force.  As of 2013, 
                                                          
129.  Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge: Inside America’s Police 
Departments, PEW SOC. TRENDS (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/inside-americas-police-departments/. 
130.  Sesoko Interview, supra note 89. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Jamie Kalven, Code of Silence: Part 1, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 6, 2016, 6:00 
AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/10/06/in-the-chicago-police-department-if-the-
bosses-say-it-didnt-happen-it-didnt-happen/. Shannon Spalding, a former Chicago 
police officer, was financial destroyed and stripped of her job for failing to abide by 
the “code of silence” or “thin blue line.” In an interview, Spalding called this behavior 
“‘Operation Smoke and Mirrors . . . If four bosses in the department say it didn’t 
happen, it didn’t happen.’” Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  McBride Interview, supra note 42. 
136.  Id. 
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women accounted for just 12% of local, full-time police officers in the 
United States.137  In South Africa, women accounted for 32.5% of 
commissioned officers in the 2015-2016 annual report.138  However, 
only 18% of officers patrolling the street were women.139  In the United 
States, analysis shows “hyper masculinity of the rank and file is 
encouraged, reinforced and policed in numerous ways.”140 
One report found the level of an officer’s insecurity with his own 
masculinity (also known as masculinity threat) predicted whether the 
officer had used force against Black men in the last two years.141  South 
African police officers, like their American counterparts, also have a 
culture of masculinity.142  Antony Altbeker, a researcher who 
conducted an ethnographic study of police officers noted, “It’s quite 
explicit. It’s all for the women’s safety, obviously, is the way they see 
it. Nevertheless, it’s constant in the way they police gender roles.”143  
Therefore, South Africa and the United States’ policing share similar 
barriers in the form of racial bias and patriarchal attitudes that 
undermine changes in policing post-apartheid. 
B. Patterns of Behavior and Continued Tools 
In the United States and South Africa, the continuation in policing 
behavior suggests that institutional biases create differences in lived 
experiences for citizens, even if the laws provide equal protection under 
                                                          
137.  Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, 
and Practices, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 4 (2015). 
138.  Dep’t of Police, SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE: ANNUAL REPORT 
2015/16 34 (2016), https://www.saps.gov.za/about/stratframework/ 
annual_report/2015_2016/saps_annual_report_2015_2016.pdf.  
139.  Interview with David Bruce, Independent Researcher, in Johannesburg, S. 
Afr. (Jan. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Bruce Interview]. 
140.  L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 
12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 131 (2014). 
141.  Id. at 136. 
142.  McBride Interview, supra note 42. 
143.  Altbeker Interview, supra note 108. An ethnographic study generally 
“refers to a social science research that [] explores ‘the nature of particular social 
phenomena, rather than setting out to test hypotheses about them . . . .’” Davis S. 
Caudill, Law, Science and Science Studies: Contrasting the Deposition of a Scientific 
Expert With Ethnographic Studies of Scientific Practice, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 85, 
85 (2002).  
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the law.  The racial biases and presumptions regarding who is presumed 
a criminal seem to remain in both countries.  Furthermore, in both 
countries, the way police officers conceive their role and the tools that 
are used to effectuate their roles do not appear to have significantly 
changed since segregation or apartheid. 
In the United States, neither explicit racism nor implicit racial bias 
was associated with greater use of force by police officers.144  A 
masculinity report conducted in the United States hypothesized racial 
stereotypes about Black men as “violent, criminal, dangerous, and 
animal-like” construct Black men as more masculine in relation to other 
men, and that this masculinity threat causes police officers to use 
greater force.145  Finding masculinity threats as the cause for greater use 
of force, rather than racism, helps explain why increasing 
representation of Black police officers does not reduce the use of force 
by officers in a police department.146 
In South Africa, 63% of commissioned officers are Black African 
and 24% are White.147  Still, Antony Altbeker, the ethnographic 
researcher described above, stated, “I’m pretty sure they [Black 
officers] have internalized all the profiling. I don’t think there’s too 
much of a difference between White cops and Black cops between 
who’s a criminal and who’s not. I think that those sets of ideas and 
prejudices are common throughout the police.”148  According to Dr. 
Fazel Randera, who served on the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, these biases are not new, stating that prior 
to the end of apartheid in 1994, the “propaganda was Black people were 
savages.”149 
The way police officers conceptualize their roles in both countries 
also reflects that change has been limited since the days when police 
officers were enforcing racial separation.  In the United States, 31% of 
                                                          
144.  Richardson & Goff, supra note 140, at 136. 
145.  Id. at 136–37. 
146.  See generally Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Jill Nicholson-Crotty & Sergio 
Fernandez, Will More Black Cops Matter? Officer Race and Police-Involved 
Homicides of Black Citizens, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 206 (2017). 
147.  Altbeker Interview, supra note 108. 
148.  Id.  
149.  Interview with Dr. Fazel Randera, Fmr. Comm., The Indep. S. Afr. Truth 
and Reconciliation Comm’n, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter 
Randera Interview].  
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officers say they view themselves as protectors, 8% as enforcers and 
62% view themselves as protectors and enforcers equally.150  Similarly, 
in South Africa, Altbeker says, “What really changed after apartheid 
was who’s in power, but what was supposed to change was that police 
were supposed to see themselves as not protecting the state, but 
providing services to citizens.”151 
In the United States, academia has drawn clear lines from slave 
catchers to policing during segregation to police violence in the present 
day.152  Additionally, the United States’ history of racial discrimination 
has been explored in popular culture through films and books.153  In 
South Africa, both the media and elders in communities have drawn the 
connection between apartheid-era policing practices and current 
misconduct.154  One organizer, Bongani Xezwi, said the police use the 
“same tactics of intimidation as [the] apartheid government.”155  Based 
on Xezwi’s interactions with the police, he believes “most of the 
policies that were supposed to change after apartheid didn’t change.”156  
Willie Hofmeyr opined that there was a post-apartheid effort to try to 
make the police force more of a civilian force; however, in the face of 
growing crime, “some of the militarization [of the police] is 
justifiable.”157  Journalist Mpikeleni Duma referred to the efforts to 
demilitarize the police as “cosmetic rethinking.”158 
Ultimately, police officers in neither country are able to self-
regulate nor hold themselves accountable because there is a policing 
culture and system that allows police officers to hide under a shield of 
impunity. 
                                                          
150.  Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/behind-the-badge/. 
151.  Altbeker, supra note 108. 
152.  See Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, Stop and Frisk: From Slave-Catchers to 
NYPD, A Legal Commentary, 21 TROTTER R. 98 (2013). 
153.  See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 101; see also THE 13TH (Netflix 
2016). 
154.  Segodi Interview, supra note 38. 
155.  Xezwi Interview, supra note 57. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Hofmeyr Interview, supra note 6. 
158.  Duma Interview, supra note 54. 
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V. LESSONS ON HOW TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR  
POLICE VIOLENCE 
In comparing the structures and functional practices that strengthen 
and limit accountability in the United States and South Africa, one may 
glean lessons on how to improve these systems that are obfuscated 
when only looking at one system.  First, it is necessary to exercise 
caution in presuming solutions can be derived from measurable 
disparities between the two countries.  Intersectional analysis suggests 
the racial composition of a police department does not change incidents 
of unjustified use of force; however, gender composition may.  This 
supports the hypothesis that the cause of racial disparities in use of force 
cases may relate more to perceptions of a masculinity threat—often 
related to race—rather than implicit or explicit racial bias.159  Thus, an 
effort to correct racial biases in police departments would not 
necessarily solve the issues of use of force. 
Second, the comparative analysis illustrates the United States can 
do much more to improve the structural process of investigating and 
prosecuting police violence, and the current challenges are not inherent 
or forgone conclusions.  On the other hand, South Africa’s challenges 
demonstrates that changing formal institutions will only fix some of the 
issues, and there is a need to actively work on changing the culture of 
the institutions.  As Matthews Sesoko points out, corruption for the 
purposes of monetary gain does not necessitate violence on the part of 
police.160  Therefore, misconduct in South Africa is more attributable 
to culture than issues of corruption.161  Whereas the United States 
places a significant emphasis on policing culture without considering 
institutional responsibility for holding police accountable, and whether 
the appropriate institutions are empowered and capable to successfully 
investigate police. 
Finally, the public must be empowered to hold the government 
accountable to have consistent limits on state violence.  This can be 
done through structures that improve voice, representation, and 
influence as well as cultural changes that help improve individuals’ 
belief in their own agency and ability to exert influence.  The structural 
                                                          
159.  Richardson & Goff, supra note 140. 
160.  Sesoko Interview, supra note 89. 
161.  Id. 
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robustness of the South African prosecution system demonstrates that 
the United States needs to address its institutional shortcomings to 
improve its processes for police accountability.  However, some of the 
functional neutering of South African prosecutors’ efficacy 
demonstrates a need to examine systems of accountability to identify 
and correct breakdowns in those systems. 
In both countries, little, if any, attention is paid to complicit 
prosecutors who perpetuate institutional racism by failing to hold police 
officers accountable.  Given that prosecutors were responsible for 
enforcing many of the segregation-era and apartheid-era laws, they 
provide an instructive case study for how institutional racism 
perpetuates after the formal dismantling of legal structures of racial 
separation.  The case study outlined in this paper demonstrates that 
complicity in perpetuating institutionalized injustices and inequities is 
not necessarily a problem of individuals with bad intentions.  Rather it 
is a problem of structures, systems, and cultures that create barriers to 
accountability.  Due to path dependency, efforts must be taken in a 
proactive manner to change these structures, systems and cultures. 
A. History 
First, a shared national history is important to understand the 
historical narratives that influence some citizens.  In the United States, 
efforts to document the history of slavery and racial violence are 
relatively recent.162  As a result, in the last fifty years after the end of 
segregation, and over the last 200 years since the end of slavery, counter 
narratives have developed around both of those systems of oppression.  
Part of the challenge is that the Confederacy continues to be celebrated 
publicly in parts of the United States.163  On the other hand, the more 
painful parts of American history are just now becoming public through 
                                                          
162.  See, e.g., Universities Studying Slavery, PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON 
SLAVERY AND THE UNIVERSITY, http://slavery.virginia.edu/universities-studying-
slavery/; Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror, EQUAL JUST. 
INITIATIVE (2015), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/lynching-in-america-second-
edition-summary.pdf/. 
163.  See Joe Sterling, A New Alabama Law Makes Sure Confederate 
Monuments are Here to Stay, CNN (May 26, 2017, 5:19 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/26/us/alabama-confederate-monuments-bill-trnd/. 
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the National Museum of African American History and Culture and 
Equal Justice Initiative’s lynching memorial.164 
By contrast, South Africa rapidly attempted to contend with its 
complicated history through museums such as the Apartheid 
Museum165 and historical sites such as Liliesleaf Farm.166  This may be 
attributed to the differences in the demographics of the two countries or 
it may reflect a greater willingness to deal with past challenges in the 
absence of a narrative around exceptionalism that is embedded into the 
American psyche.167 
B. “Rehumanization” 
After a political system systematically dehumanizes people based 
on socially constructed characteristics, the country must undergo a 
national process of “rehumanization” to heal.  In the United States, the 
government has only recently begun to apologize for its past 
misconduct.  Indeed, the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP) apologized for its past role in racially discriminatory policing, 
and the U.S. House of Representatives apologized for the United States’ 
history of slavery.168  Additionally, the Department of Justice has 
                                                          
164.  See Vinson Cunningham, Making a Home for Black History, THE NEW 
YORKER (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/29/ 
analyzing-the-national-museum-of-african-american-history-and-culture; Jonathan 
Capehart, What the Lynching Memorial Will Force Us All to Face, WASH. POST (Dec. 
21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/wp/2016/12/21/what-the-lynching-memorial-will-force-us-all-to-
face/?utm_term=.aa65bf96557c. 
165. APARTHEID MUSEUM, About the Museum, 
https://www.apartheidmuseum.org/about-museum-0 (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).  
166. SOUTH AFR. EXPLORED, The Liliesleaf Farm, https://www.sa-
venues.com/attractionsga/liliesleaf-farm.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).  
167.  “‘Faith in their own [American] exceptionalism has sometimes led to a 
certain obtuseness on the part of Americans, a tendency to preach at other nations 
rather than listen to them, a tendency as well to assume that American motives are 
pure where those of others are not . . .’” Harold Hongju Koh, On American 
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2003). 
168.  Tom Jackman, U.S. Police Chiefs Group Apologizes for ‘Historical 
Mistreatment’ of Minorities, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/10/17/head-of-u-s-
police-chiefs-apologizes-for-historic-mistreatment-of-minorities/?utm_term=. 
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funded a Trust and Justice initiative to attempt to facilitate 
conversations in the spirit of reconciliation at the local level.169  
However, these conversations are taking place decades, if not centuries, 
after the initial violations occurred.  Therefore, the process of healing 
is more difficult because dehumanizing narratives have passed down 
through generations without government acknowledgment of these 
atrocities.  Now, those attempting to undergo this healing in the United 
States do not necessarily have the memory of overt injustices their 
ancestors participated in or were complicit in allowing to occur. 
However, in South Africa, there was a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (“TRC”).170  Robert McBride, who received amnesty from 
the TRC said, “When you have the opportunity to speak to people who 
you have caused harm it rehumanizes you to yourself.”171  He clarified 
that it serves to ameliorate the “psychic numbing where you are solely 
focused on your political mission.”172  Further, Fazel Randera, who was 
a commissioner of the TRC, noted, “[O]ne doesn’t get the sense that 
any White person feels that they were complicit in apartheid,” and, 
consequently, they “don’t understand the advantages they got that 
continue to give them advantages in the new South Africa.”173 
One reason for this may be that while some institutional 
examination was done, its focus had a limited scope.  Antony Altbeker 
says that because the TRC’s focus was on political policing and not day-
to-day policing, a majority of police officers think the TRC was 
irrelevant to the work they were involved in.174  Altbeker believes, 
“[T]he gross human rights violations focus of [the] TRC missed the 
whole point of apartheid.  Because, measured on those terms, it wasn’t 
particularly oppressive.  The point of apartheid was the systemic 
indignity, oppressive, and resource sapping that was part of it.”175  In 
                                                          
3d428df1f12d; House Apologizes for Slavery, ‘Jim Crow’ Injustices, CNN (July 29, 
2008, 7:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/29/house.slavery/. 
169.  Reconciliation, NATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR BUILDING COMMUNITY TRUST 
AND JUSTICE, https://trustandjustice.org/resources/intervention/reconciliation (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2018).  
170.  Promotion of National United and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.). 
171.  McBride Interview, supra note 42. 
172.  Id. 
173.  Randera Interview, supra note 149. 
174.  Altbeker Interview, supra note 108. 
175.  Id. 
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this way, while a process like the TRC may provide rehumanization for 
individuals, more is needed to change institutions and acknowledge 
complicity. 
C. Trainings on Institutional Roles in Past Injustices 
A national shared history and rehumanizing process is insufficient 
to combat the path dependency of institutions without specific trainings 
within institutions that allow new members to understand what past 
injustices the institution has committed.  This education allows newer 
individuals to understand public reactions to the institution and builds 
a culture of vigilance in ensuring similar injustices never occur again. 
Neither country has pursued a national effort to incentivize 
trainings for all prosecutors’ offices to understand and acknowledge the 
roles their institutions had in perpetuating unjust laws nor their 
complicity in allowing crimes of racial terror to go unpunished.  In 
South Africa, the lack of historical trainings has allowed for a counter-
narrative to develop within the policing subculture about police 
officers’ role in apartheid.176  Therefore, many ignore their role in 
perpetuating apartheid and believe they were instrumental in providing 
the order to transition South Africa to democracy.177  It is important for 
institutions, whose members were actively or complicity involved in 
perpetuating injustices in the past, to teach new members about the 
institution’s history so they can appreciate and cautiously hold the 
power they currently yield. 
D. Reexamination of Tools Institutions Use 
If institutions have new mandates, such as the way prosecutors’ 
offices are now required to ensure an equal application of the law, it 
drastically shifts their roles from enforcers to protectors.  As such, it is 
important to reexamine the tools those institutions are using to 
effectuate those goals.  In the United States, this has not occurred in a 
public manner around prosecution though there have been efforts to 
reimagine who can fulfill that role.  For example, in a recent election, a 
                                                          
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. 
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civil rights lawyer won a prosecutorial election.178  There was also 
thoughtful examination around the culture of policing at the national 
level in the United States through the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing.179 
In post-apartheid South Africa, people believed the problem of bad 
actors was endemic in the police, and there was less concern about 
prosecutors’ behavior under apartheid.180  Still, during the transition 
period from apartheid to democracy, prosecutors played a key role in 
investigating rogue elements of the armed services and had the 
opportunity to reexamine their role as enforcers and shift to a protector 
model.181  A reevaluation of the tools police officers use was 
contemplated during the negotiations prior to a new constitution, but 
was left incomplete.182  As a result, police officers today are widely 
criticized for their inability to effectively conduct public service or 
public order policing.183 
E. Institutions Need to Commit Themselves to Data Collection  
and Transparency 
To illuminate and hold institutions accountable for their actions, 
institutions need to commit to data collection and transparency of that 
data.  In the United States, with a system of decentralized prosecutions, 
there are only a few offices that are beginning to share data.  For 
example, in Cleveland, Ohio, the prosecutor’s office publicly shares 
data on prosecution disaggregated by race.184  Moreover, in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the District Attorney’s office announced 
                                                          
178.  Julia Terruso, DA Primary Winner Larry Krasner: I’m not beholden to 
Soros, PHILLY.COM (May 17, 2017, 12:24 PM), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/city/Larry-Krasner-District-Attorney-
Democratic-primary-winner-Soros.html. 
179.  Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (May 2015), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf. 
180.  Hofmeyr, supra note 6. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Friedman Interview, supra note 27. 
184.  Benchmarks and Data, CUYAHOGA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, 
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/en-US/benchmarks-data.aspx (last visited May 
2017).  
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transparent use-of-force protocol.185  In South Africa, some of these 
transparency measures are embedded within the structures through 
reporting requirements.186  However, there are flaws in ensuring 
robustness of data collection and ensuring there are adequate resources 
and information provided to the public so they can serve as a check on 
data collection and transparency.187 
F. Government Needs to Encourage Civic Participation 
All of the information provided to the public is not actionable 
because as discussed supra, individuals in both countries have limited 
ability to participate in the political process.188  Accordingly, 
governments must actively work to combat political inequality so that 
all citizens can have voice, representation, and influence.  In the United 
States, this is largely about improving processes that confer more 
political power on some individuals over others.  In South Africa, this 
is also a concern; but there is a broader concern that as a young 
democracy, many people still do not know their individual due process 
rights under the new Constitution.189  In both countries, the 
governments can close information gaps through outreach efforts and 
the creation of forums that actively solicit feedback from citizens to 
ensure they feel heard and the government is responsive to their 
concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, both the United States and South Africa struggle 
with political inequality that continues to create barriers for the will of 
the people to be enacted in government.  Furthermore, both countries 
have structural issues in prosecutions of police violence that limit its 
effectiveness as a tool for accountability.  These issues are exacerbated 
                                                          
185.  Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, Philadelphia District Attorney 
Announces Transparent, Progressive Officer Involved Shooting Protocol (Nov. 10, 
2016), https://phillyda.wordpress.com/2016/11/10/philadelphia-district-attorney-
announces-transparent-progressive-officer-involved-shooting-protocol/. 
186.  Bruce Interview, supra note 139. 
187.  McBride Interview, supra note 42. 
188.  See Discussion Part I. 
189.  Randera Interview, supra note 149. 
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by cultural and systemic issues surrounding prosecutions of police 
violence.  Similarly, civil lawsuits as a tool of accountability have 
limitations.  Finally, an ongoing culture of impunity within policing 
makes internal self-regulation a challenge as a tool of accountability.  
Still, given the countries’ shared history of racial separation, a 
comparative analysis of these countries is instructive in providing 
lessons for how both countries can improve their systems of 
accountability around police violence.  Finally, using the complicity of 
prosecutors and other challenges of policing accountability, a 
framework for undoing institutionalized injustices can be proposed with 
the hope of limiting future societal harms by institutions created to serve 
the public. 
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